The Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 repealed the statute itself but expressly preserved the preamble. The Charities Act 1960 repealed the 1888 Act and thus the preamble. However, its final repeal does not affect the authority of the cases decided on it nor the principles on which future cases are to be decided: Incorporated 23 while Buckley LJ held that worship 'must have some at least of the following characteristics: submission to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession'. 24 He found that the evidence put forward, including the Church of Scientology's book of ceremonies, contained 'no element of worship at all'. 25 By contrast, for Lord Denning MR, the phrase to be defined was 'the combined phrase, "place of meeting for religious worship" as used in the statute of 1855'. 26 For
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Denning, this connoted 'a place of which the principal use is as a place where people come together as a congregation or assembly to do reverence to God'; 'Religious worship means reverence or veneration of God or of a Supreme Being'. The decision in Segerdal did not, therefore, concern the definition of religion as such. The judgments of Buckley LJ and Winn LJ focused on the definition of worship simpliciter while Lord Denning sought to define the combined phrase religious worship. It is curious, therefore, that this case concerning registration law was heavily relied upon in the second case which concerned charity law to provide a definition of religion.
22 [1970] 2 QB 679. 23 At 709. 24 He qualified this: 'I do not say that you would need to find every element in every act which could properly be described as worship, but when you find an act which contains none of those elements it cannot, in my judgment, answer to the description of an act of worship': at 709. 25 At 709. 26 He noted that the Chapel of the Church of Scientology was not a 'place of religious worship' because the creed of the Church of Scientology was 'more a philosophy of the existence of man or of life, rather than a religion', there was an absence of 'reverence or veneration' and 'considerable stress on the spirit of man': at 707.
In the second case, Re South Place Ethical Society, Barralet v AG 27 , the court held that the South Place Ethical Society, a society for the 'study and dissemination of ethical principles and the cultivation of a rational religious sentiment', was not charitable for the advancement of religion. 28 Echoing Lord Denning in Segerdal, Dillon J distinguished religion from ethics as being 'concerned with man's relations with God' rather than 'with man's relations with man' and held that 'two of the essential attributes of religion are faith and worship; faith in a god and worship of that god'. 29 Quoting with approval Buckley LJ's definition of worship in Segerdal, Dillon J concluded that the South Place Ethical Society did not have the purpose of advancing religion because there was no 'worship in the sense which worship is an attribute of religion': 'indeed, it is not possible to worship in that way a mere ethical or philosophical ideal.' 30 No explanation was given as to why worship ought to be a definitional aspect of the term advancement of religion. While Segerdal was concerned with defining the phrase 'place of meeting for religious worship' under registration law, Re South
Place Ethical Society was concerned with defining 'advancement of religion' under charity
law. Yet, the definition for the former was adopted without question for the latter. The requirement for 'faith in a god and worship of that god' became to be understood as the common law definition of religion, except in relation to Buddhism which was accepted to be 50 'The belief must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity; 'The belief must relate to matters more than merely trivial. It must possess an adequate degree of seriousness and importance'; 'The belief must also be coherent in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood'. These were described as 'objective' requirements but that does not require the belief itself to be assessed objectively but rather the criterion against which the belief is to be examined is to be assessed objectively. The definition of 'basic standards of human dignity', for instance, is an objective one. It was also stressed that: 'Overall, these threshold requirements should not be set at a level which would deprive minority beliefs of the protection they are intended to have under the Convention'. 51 since that would make it difficult to 'set any limits on the range of beliefs that would be opened up for protection'. However, neither his Lordship nor any subsequent judgments on Article 9 have articulated where these limits are to be placed.
The case law on religious discrimination has followed the approach of the human rights jurisprudence not only in adopting a wide definition of religion or belief but also in struggling consistently to identify the limits that are to be placed on it. (i) The belief must be genuinely held.
(ii) It must be a belief and not ... an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available.
(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.
(iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.
(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. 67 and a belief that belief that a Poppy should be worn during the week prior to Remembrance Sunday. 68 Drawing any points of principle out of this case law is difficult, to say the least.
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The confusion is epitomised by the way that it is now unclear as to whether political beliefs are protected under discrimination law. 70 In Grainger, it was suggested that Baroness
Scotland's choice of words referring only to 'support for a political party' as something that might not be protected left open the question of whether 'a belief in a political philosophy or doctrine' might now fall within the definition. 71 In Kelly v Unison 72 it was suggested that a distinction could be drawn between 'political beliefs which involve the objective of the creation of a legally binding structure by power or government regulating others', which are not protected, and the beliefs that 'are expressed by his own practice but where he has no ambition to impose his scheme on others', which may be protected. 73 However, this distinction has not found favour with subsequent Employment Tribunal decisions with employment tribunals chairs in several cases ignoring the question of whether the belief might have been 'political' or stating that the appellate courts had not definitely determined the question of whether political beliefs could now be included. The confusion here results from the partial harmonisation of the definition of religion or belief in human rights and discrimination law contexts. Employment Tribunals have followed Baroness Scotland in adopting the wide approach to the definition of belief found in human rights law but they have come unstuck given that discrimination law explicitly protects only religious or philosophical beliefs. 74 As with the adaption of the registration law definition of religion for charity law purposes in Re South Place Ethical Society, the pragmatic appropriation of definitional criteria is problematic, given that significant differences between the definitions have been ignored. The problem is that the move towards a universal definition has been halfhearted.
C. Developments in Charity Law
This problem has increased in the context of charity law itself. The Charities Act 2006, in providing the first codification of centuries of case law, stated that religion includes 'a religion which involves belief in more than one god, and a religion which does not involve belief in a god'. 75 This removed theoretical uncertainty surrounding whether the Segerdal- 73 This distinction is odd, however, given that many religions proselytise and so could be said to have an ambition to impose their beliefs on others. Although secular belief systems may still enjoy the fiscal and legal benefits of being charitable provided that they come under another head of charity, 79 their exclusion from the head of advancement of religion may well infringe Article 9 ECHR which talks of the right to 79 In 2002 the Charity Commission recognised the 'promotion of religious harmony' as a new charitable purpose which is not restricted to 'religions' hitherto recognised under charity law but also includes 'beliefs' as recognised by the ECHR. <http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/registeredcharities/harmony.asp>. See now Charities Act 2011s3(1)(h).
manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice or observance. 80 This point is underlined by the third characteristic articulated by the Charity Commission which brought charity law in line with the requirements found in the Article 9 jurisprudence requiring 'cogency, cohesion, seriousness and importance', again without the Williamson warning that 'too much should not be demanded in this regard' and that these are to be interpreted as 'minimum' and 'modest' requirements. 81 As with discrimination law, aspects of the definition of religion for Article 9 purposes became part of the charity law definition but no attempt was given to square the fact that charity law does not protect religion or belief but only protects religion (and beliefs in a 'supreme being or entity'). Indeed, both the third and fourth characteristics were new and lacked any statutory or judicial authority. The fourth characteristic introduced a public benefit requirement into the Charity Commission's definition of religion, muddying the Commission's own distinction between identifying whether the trust has met a description of charitable purposes and identifying whether there is a public benefit.
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As with the five tests laid out in Grainger, the Charity Commission's four characteristics have led to seemingly arbitrary decisions. The decision in relation to the Gnostic Society relied heavily upon the fourth characteristic and seemingly rejected the application on the basis that the Society did not correspond with the Commission's expectations of an institutional religion. Although the Gnostic Society prayed for humanity and followed Christian teachings such as 'love thy neighbour', the Commission found it striking that 'there was no evidence of consistent application of such codes on their website 80 or in the literature'. 83 The dismissal of the application of the Gnostic Society was followed by the successful application by the Druid Network. 84 In this decision, the Commission again applied its four characteristics of religion. 85 Here, however, in relation to the fourth characteristic, the Commission referred to the Network's 'principle of honourable relationships' and the way in which the promotion of ethical codes were integrated explicitly in its objects and through its website. 86 The Commission therefore concluded that there was 'evidence of an identifiable positive beneficial ethical framework promoted by the Druid
Network that is capable of having a beneficial impact on the community at large'. Ironically, although this last criterion was the most legally binding upon the Commission cohesion, seriousness and importance in the form of the belief system'. The reference to 'belief system' is interesting here given that charity law protects 'religion' rather than 'religion or belief'. This underlines that some forms of belief are to be included as part of the definition of religion. The inclusion of this ECHR requirement is preferable to its exclusion in Hodkin given the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, again the
Williamson warnings about these requirements needing to be set at a 'minimum' and 'modest' level' are omitted. 117 Furthermore, the way in which the Commission articulated this requirement is problematic in two respects. First, the Commission stated that Jediism is not a 'sufficiently cogent and distinct religion'. 118 No authority is given for this requirement that a religion needs to be 'distinct' and, although ecumenical and interfaith groups could instead seek charitable status for the promotion of religious harmony, 119 this novel requirement would prove problematic given that many religions have much in common and religions often develop from one another. Second, the Commission stated that there 'is insufficient evidence of an objective understanding of Jediism as opposed to a self-defining system which may be pursued outside the confines of a religion and in a secular manner' and placed weight on the fact that 'it is not obligatory to interpret and follow the Jedi Doctrine as areligion'. 120 The Commission considered that: 'Any cogency and cohesion that is present is eroded by the individual's ability to develop themselves within a loose framework and follow an individual experiential philosophy or way of life as a secular belief system'. 121 This would rule out individualised religious experiences contrary to the principle expressed in outcome and the decisions they make affect not just the claims in front of them but those who will bring and will not bring claims in the future. Defining religion is an exercise in power that has significant legal, political, economic, social and cultural effects. 127 As James Wiggins has argued, religious diversity requires the conclusion that the definition of religion 'must become more expansive and elastic than ever before in human history'. 128 Yet, an overly expansive approach may render the term religion meaningless. The central problem remains that identified by the sociologist Georg Simmel: managing to craft a definition of religion that is both precise and sufficiently comprehensive. Commission's decision on Jediism which underscored how confused and arbitrary the case law has become. There Hodkin was relied upon to erect a problematic distinction between secular and non-secular belief systems that now applies under charity and registration law but not under human rights and discrimination law. Hodkin was then ignored to state that worship remains a definitional attribute of religion for charity law purposes despite the fact that the Segerdal decision upon which South Place Ethical Society relied is no longer good law.
Unlike in Hodkin, the Charity Commission applied ECHR standards about the nature of a religion or belief. This followed the trend set by Employment Tribunals whereby those standards apply in discrimination law despite that area of law protecting only religious and philosophical beliefs (rather than beliefs per se) and these standards have been interpreted in a more demanding way outside the context of human rights law. 130 The level of uncertainty, the arbitrary distinctions drawn and the questionable interpretation of the new tests created by 130 The decisions of the Charity Commission show that these standards also apply in charity law despite that area of law protecting only religious beliefs which have been understood to possibly include non-secular beliefs.
the Charity Commission and Employment Tribunals are matters of concern not only in terms of whether the reasoning is compatible with Article 9. A number of statements made by courts and tribunals are troubling on closer inspection and constitute the 'stuff of theological debate' which Lord Toulson was keen to avoid as a matter of principle. 131 The time is therefore apt to reconsider a universal definition of religion under English law.
The case law reveals that elements of a universal definition already exist. These need to be refashioned in order to remove inconsistencies that exist in different areas of law. The
Charity Commission in its recent decisions has spoken of there being four characteristics. Reexamining these in turn taking into account developments in registration, human rights and discrimination law may point to a way forward, drawing upon insights from the sociology of religion.
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The first characteristic is that there is a belief. While registration and charity law Discrimination law has adopted a half-way approach, generally following the human rights case law but specifying that beliefs must be religious or philosophical and may or may not be political. implying or forming the basis of religion' and 'the subjective attitude of human beings'. 138 Methodological agnosticism requires the making of that distinction and the bracketing aside of the question of the status of religious claims'. 139 As Berger has put it, 'religion is to be understood as a human projection, grounded in the specific infrastructures of human history'. 140 Methodological agnosticism, as a principle, could inform the interest in definitions taken by lawyers as well as sociologists. 141 As Roger Cotterrell has noted, both law and sociology must define and conceptualize very elusive aspects of human behaviour.' 142 Sociologists and lawyers are primarily interested in religion as a human activity and take an ultimately 'pragmatical, contextualised approach' to defining religion. 143 Law does not seek to describe religion as a phenomenon but simply seeks to establish rules to regulate and facilitate its exercise within wider social life.
It follows that a functional approach to defining religion should be taken. The approach of Williamson should be followed; it should generally be accepted that freedom of religion protects the subjective beliefs of the individual and arbitrary distinctions should not be drawn. There should be no requirement that beliefs must be religious or philosophical (as in discrimination law), spiritual and non-secular (as in Hodkin and the Jediism decision) or that non-philosophical or political beliefs (as in discrimination law) lifestyles and activities performed for recreation can be clearly distinguished from manifestations of religion or belief exclusion will relate to the human behaviour -the manifestation of the belief -rather than the nature of the belief itself. These claims will typically be excluded not on grounds of the definition of religion but in relation to other tests that need to be satisfied in order for the religious right to be enjoyed. In the context of charity law, the focus will be on the public benefit test; in human rights law, the emphasis will be on the Article 9(2) limitations on the manifestation of religion; and in discrimination law the importance will be based on proportionality. A functional definition will not protect religious practices that are beyond the pale but such practices will be excluded as manifestations of human behaviour rather than on Williamson that a belief must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity. 144 In short, adopting a functional methodological agnostic approach to defining religion could lead to the following universal definition under English law:
Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual. Religion includes all forms of belief, including lack of belief. The belief must be a genuinely held worldview that relates to a weighty and substantial aspect of life and attains a minimum and modest level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The belief can be manifested or advanced through worship, teaching, practice or observance. It must be consistent with basic standards of human dignity or integrity.
